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THE VALUE DEBATE IN REGULATION
By R. LIoRA SALTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this paper is the value debate that occurs in the regulatory
forum. Three assumptions are made. First, that regulation constitutes a forum
where interests are negotiated, in other words, an arena of politics. Second,
many of the interest groups in the regulatory forum are also active in other
areas of political life. Third, the regulatory debate, like any political debate,
involves an exchange of ideas, information and proposals all of which are
grounded in the theoretical orientation and value perspective, however ill-
defined, of its participants.
Given the similarity between regulatory and political debate in general
terms, a similarity in their value debates might be expected. Positions taken
by participants should be comparable to what they are in other political
arenas. Their stance on any issue in regulation should be predictable, if one
can identify the patterns of interest and influence that are involved.
This is not the case. In Canada, the regulatory debate is not like others.
Certainly, participants approach issues from their general understanding of
social dynamics, but apparently oppositional groups unite on some issues while
established, deeply-rooted political coalitions fall apart. The theoretical, ideol-
ogical and value differences so easily recognized in other political arenas, the
polarities of left and right for example, are not as apparent in the regulatory
debate. It is difficult to predict the position that a group will take on a specific
issue as precarious alliances develop among those who might otherwise hold
sharply divergent views. These coalitions prove to be more than tactical.
Consequently, a conventional analysis of the value debate in regulation
will not suffice. For example, an interest group analysis is useful but limited
when traditional political divisions and conflicts do not hold in the regulatory
arena. If all political debate is infused with value conflicts, the specificity of
regulation will be blurred by a relatively simple identification of the values in
conflict. Actively affected industry groups will represent their interests in the
regulatory arena as they do elsewhere. Given their relative political dominance,
they are likely to be influential, as they are elsewhere; even to the point that
one could claim that regulatory agencies are "captured" by the industries they
regulate. Industry groups will tend to share few of the value perspectives of
advocate groups. Yet in a regulatory debate these groups may find themselves
on unpredictable sides of the issues and in alliances with those whom they
normally oppose in political debate.
If analysis of the politics of regulation will not suffice to account for the
unusual contours of the regulatory debate, and if an identification of the value-
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conflict provides few additional insights, a different approach is necessary.
This paper concentrates on the nature of the regulatory debate as a debate.
The approach will be from the discipline of communication studies. The case
study will be communication regulation because that case illustrates clearly
the confounding issues and alliances that develop in any regulatory debate.
A few points are necessary to understand the approach and the case
study. It is worth noting some of the precepts upon which any sociological
analysis of a value debate are based.
A. The Sociological Approach
First, what is a value debate? It includes any debate about policies af-
fecting rights or beliefs. The debate about the state's right to regulate is a
value debate. The debate about the place of religious stations in the Canadian
broadcasting system includes a value discussion. Any debate over the appor-
tionment of restrictions or rewards as a result of regulatory decisions includes
a value component. An increase in rates, for example, may price a tele-
communication service beyond the reach of some sectors of the community
or industry. Assuming that the increase could be justified on economic grounds,
the decision to grant or refuse it involves value choices. A decision calling for
a cross-subsidy involves the same considerations.
Sociologists go beyond merely identifying value debates and argue that
any debate, discussion, study or analysis involves a value component. The
point is most evident with respect to political debates, including regulation.
Political orientations, based to some extent on value choices, temper the re-
sponses actors make to the agency and even to the evidence presented. The
process of selection involved in any description of reality, any choice of re-
search problem, any synthesis of information is affected by value considera-
tions. Values determine what will be considered worthy of attention and shape
the choice of approach and methodology used. The economist who in seeking
methodological rigour relegates many features of the environment to the
category of "externalities" is making as many value choices, sociologists would
argue, as the anthropologist presenting evidence on the native way of life.
Identification of the value debate is often simple. The deregulation de-
bate in the United States, where state intervention in the economy is highly
contentious, focuses on the tension between state and individual rights and is
clearly a value debate. In Canada, and specifically in communication regula-
tion, the value debate is much more difficult to identify. State intervention is,
and has been since Confederation, a central fact of political life. Regulation
is one option for a government also engaged in extensive public ownership
and industrial development projects. As a result, the issues in communication
regulation, such as "user pay" or "public access", are viewed differently in
Canada, and the value debate inherent in any discussion of these issues is less
likely to be evident.
The sociological approach of viewing all debate as inherently value-
imbued- permits us to go beyond debates that are easily identified as value
based. By concentrating on the problems chosen as significant by the actors,
the information presented and the methodologies used, the sociological ap-
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proach provides clues to what might otherwise be obscured. It focuses on the
underlying factors that make regulatory debate, as a value debate, unusual.
Second, a sociological law is that things perceived as real are real in
their consequences. In other words, if actors in a regulatory debate believe
they represent the public interest (as most do), that belief, however tenuous
its claim to veracity, cannot be discounted in an analysis of the debate. An
absolute standard against which all values or beliefs can be measured is un-
obtainable. This does not suggest that most sociologists would argue that all
values are simply relative or that they are committed to a value-free social
science. Simply, from a sociological point of view, values and value systems
are rooted in the cultures and experiences of those who hold them. Most
sociologists today would argue that a value-free social science (and even
natural science) is impossible. Thus, the emphasis, even for those who believe
a separation of normative and positive science is possible, is on why people
hold the beliefs they do and why those beliefs are so resistant to change.
Third, although values are individually developed and held, they are
socially derived and social in their consequences.' The concept of "free indi-
vidual choice" is meaningless, not because it is false but because it cannot,
without further elaboration, encompass the complexity of individual or moral
decision-making. Individuals do make moral choices and marketplace deci-
sions, but always within the social constraints, experiences and groups to
which they owe allegiance. Their choices are socially determined even as they
are made by freely acting individuals. Neither in theory nor in practice can
the social and the individual be fully disentangled.
Finally, all value systems have three points of reference in common no
matter how different their values may be. All value systems have a standard
against which ideas and actions can be measured. They all involve some con-
cept of resource allocation, that is, the distribution of rewards. And they are
all grounded in a specific understanding of the relationship between the social
world and the individuals who make it up. The debate in regulation is no ex-
ception. All participants touch base with a standard, a measure of what is a
fair and proper outcome of a regulatory decision. All participants have a con-
cept of resource allocation, how it should happen and how goods should be
distributed. And all have some understanding, however implicit, of the rela-
tionship between the individual and the social good.
1 As Gouldner notes in comparing sociology to Marxist approaches:
In human society, there is no inevitable law and no structuring that automatically
brings anything into existence; there is also no voluntaristic freedom that ensures
the success of heroic efforts. We had best assume that there are limits on what
may be achieved in any situation. Yet these do not depend only on what is "in"
that situation but vary also with how persons define it and what they bring to it.
The indeterminancy [sic] of this condition is acute. We really do not and cannot
know just how limiting a structure is, or how strong the will to overcome it is,
without pitting each against the other. There is an irreducible indeterminacy
here. Neither strength of will nor of structure may be known apart from grappling
with one another.
Gouldner, The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of
Theory (New York: Seabury Press, 1980) at 106.
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B. Communication Studies
The approach of communication studies requires more explication as
communication is a new discipline.2A communication analysis examines actors
and how they derive meaning from their interpretation of the messages they
receive and the context within which they operate. Sometimes a communica-
tion analysis will centre on the information being exchanged, exploring, for
example, themes and biases in media, texts or government reports. Sometimes
the emphasis is on the context within which the exchange takes place and
the purpose of the research is to determine how the context shapes the com-
munication.
An assumption is made of an underlying coherence in the way actors per-
ceive a situation and use their perceptions to shape understanding and action.
All actors operate with a "logic", although seldom would such a logic be
fully logical in the technical sense of the word. Actions, beliefs, statements
and explanations make sense to those who put them into practice. The task of
communication studies is to determine what that "sense" is.
Any analysis of values fits easily into a communication analysis, since
values are necessarily embedded in the logic of actors. In decoding any dis-
cussion, and certainly the regulatory debate, value perspectives are as impor-
tant as theoretical orientations in determining the logics involved and their im-
pact on both the nature of the debate and the resolution of its issues.
The term "decode" is used because the logic of any participant's contri-
bution is never made fully explicit. Actors may be conscious of factors that
motivate their actions, yet their most careful account is necessarily incom-
plete since all action is grounded in assumptions and routines that are not
usually recognized or acknowledged. All communication is biased. Statements
may reflect assumptions so deeply embedded in the language, culture, class
and experiences of those who make them that they seem "natural" and self-
evident. Routine practices shape what government officials, corporate execu-
tives and advocate group members do as much as any decision. They seem
"natural", and defensible. The decision to concentrate on specific issues in a
regulatory forum is seldom taken explicitly. Items omitted froni the agenda
may be as important as those discussed, but the decision to confine debate
within certain parameters is more often a product of convention than nego-
tiation.
Conflict about what should be considered relevant or the worthiness of
certain routines and practices in regulation brings some of the biases and as-
sumptions to light. In fact, it usually takes conflict, an unusual event or a
highly analytical approach to make explicit what is usually taken as natural.
Analyzing the logics in a debate is difficult, however, because several
kinds of logic may be involved and participants in the debate may shift from
one kind of logic to another without indicating or understanding the resulting
2 For a more detailed exposition see Salter, ed., Communication Studies in Cana.
da/Etudes Canadiennes en Communication (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) at 1-18.
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shift in their argument. Three distinct modes of logic are used in the regula-
tory debate. Each represents a different approach to information and argu-
ment. The three forms of logic are "theoretical", "ideological", and "sym-
bolic".3
Theoretical logic is most common in academic circles. It represents syn-
thetic analysis grounded in research. Of necessity, the complexities and con-
tradictions observed are included in the account of reality offered. Theoretical
debate attempts to be comprehensive and responsive to change on the basis
of observation. Theories of regulation, or of the economy, may differ (and
certainly what constitutes an appropriate theoretical approach is a matter of
some debate) but all theoretical work aims at being both open-ended and sys-
tematic. One can argue prescriptively on the basis of theory, as do Rawls,
Gouldner and Posner.4 Policy analysis and theoretical work are not necessarily
inconsistent since values are embedded in a logic in any case.5 Even those who
argue that value-free social or economic science can exist often combine theo-
retical work with openly prescriptive accounts, albeit by attempting to keep the
two visibly separate. Not all academics are oriented to theoretical analysis, of
course, nor do academics have a monopoly on this mode of discourse.
Ideology, unlike theory, has a tight and explicit coherence. An ideologi-
cal account imposes an explanatory grid on information (beliefs, values and
data) rendering all aspects of reality consistent with a clear picture of what is,
and should be, occurring. Complexities in the analysis disappear as a result.
Contradictions and conflicting data are relegated to other spheres of discus-
sion, often under the guise of making the argument logical. The prescriptive
elements, which may have been implicit in a theoretical account, stand out as
imperatives against a background of description.
The difference between theoretical and ideological discussion is not the
openly prescriptive aspect of much ideological work but the fact that ideology
operates with a closed system logic. All aspects of reality are accounted for
within the tight explanatory grid offered. This closed system characteristic
gives ideological accounts, even when they focus on empirical data, the char-
3 Others have drawn a distinction between the theoretical and ideological levels
of analysis (see Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism,
Populism (London: New Left Books, 1977)), but the distinction being drawn here is
somewhat different than what Laclau intends. Laclau proposes two levels of discourse,
each responsive to different pressures and constraints; I am suggesting two modes of
discourse, often used in conjunction in the same discussion or debate, each involving
a different use of information, logic, and analysis.
Edelman also uses the term "symbolic" in conjunction with political debate (see
Edelman, Political Language: Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail (New York:
Academic Press, 1977)). Again, my use differs, in this case because my emphasis is on
the nature of the debate itself.
4 See, e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harv. U. Press, 1971);
Gouldner, supra note 1; Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation (1975),
83 J. Pol. Econ. 807.
G Most sociologists today would accept the contention that theory and prescriptive
analysis are tightly connected. The current dispute in the discipline revolves around the
question of whether this connection is inevitable, avoidable in small measure, or
desirable.
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acter of religion or faith.0 In shifting from a theoretical to an ideological logic,
both the analysis and prescriptions are clarified, making for their easy assimi-
lation. Ideological arguments appear more convincing because they are more
easily understood and offer more definitive answers than theoretical accounts.
Yet, the descriptive and analytical power of the analysis resulting from the
transformation of theoretical insights into ideological accounts is less com-
plete. Moreover, the linkage between theory and ideology is masked because
crucial assumptions are left unstated in the search for consistency and clarity.
Although symbolic logic may have both theoretical and empirical refe-
rents, it is a distinct category. Two processes are involved in the creation of a
symbolic logic. The first may be called highlighting. Symbolic logic lifts par-
ticular elements from theory, from ideological discussion, or from descriptive
accounts of reality, and treats them as significant in and of themselves. The
second process is analogical reasoning, the creation of a model to represent
reality from the elements so abstracted.
Theoretical or ideological discussion involves both highlighting and ana-
logical reasoning. But in symbolic logic the abstracted concepts are treated as
real in themselves. The theoretical or empirical referent is neither given nor
evident. "Supply and demand", "norms", the "market" or "class" are con-
sidered as if they represent a directly observable phenomenon, rather than
analytical constructs. In symbolic logic these terms stand on their own without
an account of the complexities of the reality from which they were drawn or
an appreciation of the contextual factors that give meaning to the picture they
purport to describe. The linkage between the symbols, theory, and reality is
assumed, not drawn.
All these modes of logic are included in the regulatory debate, but be-
cause of the constraints placed upon participants in regulation, the symbolic
and ideological logics often appear to have the most appeal. Few participants
have the time or command the resources that theoretical work demands. If
expert witnesses argue on the basis of theory, they risk making their ideas
inaccessible to those who make regulatory decisions under pressure of time,
routine and limited resources.
Most often, in fact, regulatory debate is ideological. The effectiveness of
an argument is tied to its clarity and consistency. Because it is ideological,
however, it lacks empirical sophistication and often analysis may be presented
in an abbreviated form. As ideological argument assumes a closed system
logic, new information, contradictory findings or innovative means of conflict-
resolution are usually precluded.
Sometimes regulatory debate is characterized primarily by symbolic
logic. Words and catch-phrases take the place of discussion or debate. The
phrases become the primary means of reconstructing reality to facilitate cer-
tain policy-oriented conclusions. "Progress", for example, is counterposed
6 See Salter and Slaco, Public Inquiries in Canada (Ottawa: Science Council of
Canada, 1981) for a discussion of the problems in soliciting new information for the
resolution of issues in an inquiry or regulatory agency.
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against "a human environment". Each word or phrase replaces a longer anal-
ysis that is not articulated. The links to assessment or research are blurred;
the theoretical framework that might give depth to the concepts being used is
obscured. Advocates of various causes and interests trade terminology, often
clouded in legalisms, across the hearing floor, each hoping to catch the imag-
ination of the agency.
Two points require emphasis. The regulatory debate is characterized by
all three kinds of logic and actors shift among them. The shift may be tactical
or it may conceal a lack of data or research. Sometimes it is unconscious.
Second, the significance in the shift from theoretical to ideological, or from
ideological to symbolic logic is what gets left out in the transition. The nature
of the missing links helps to explain the unusual coalitions and conflicts that
develop.
C. Communication Regulation
Finally, some background on the case study will be useful. Communica-
tion regulation is a case ripe for analysis. In Canada, it includes both tele-
communication and media regulation and may soon include some aspects of
the new technologies as well. There is a single agency, the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), and several statutes.1
There are two distinct mandates for regulation: an exclusively social one
in broadcasting and a traditional economic one in telecommunications. But
new technologies increasingly blur the distinction between broadcasting and
telecommunications. The agency operates in an evolving economic environ-
ment, with rapidly changing technologies. At the same time there is a tension
between the regulatory authority and the departments to which it reports.8
The agency is relatively new (it was established in 1968 and gained
jurisdiction over telecommunications only in 19750), and while few in Canada
would predict full deregulation in communications, questions have been raised
about the role of a regulatory agency.' 0 Given the Canadian history of agencies
being disbanded and then recreated in a new form," it would not be surprising
if the CRTC were folded into a new commission, with a retooled mandate and
approach at some time in the future.
7 See, e.g., Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11; the National Transportation
Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17; and the Railway Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-2.
8 The conflict between agencies and the Ministries to which they report is common.
Some analysis of it can be found in Phidd and Doern, The Politics and Management
of Canadian Economic Policy (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1978).
9 The CRTC was created under the Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1967-68, c. 25, s. 5. It
gained jurisdiction over telecommunications when it was reconstituted under the
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission Act, S.C. 1974-75,
c. 49, s, 14.
l0 See, e.g., Janisch, Policy Making in Regulation: Towards a New Deflinition of the
Status of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Canada (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall LJ. 46
and Janisch, "Political Accountability for Administrative Tribunals," paper delivered at
the Conference on Administrative Justice, University of Ottawa, 1978 (mimeo).
11 A non-systematic view suggests that Canadian agencies are disbanded or re-
mandated about once every decade.
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The CRTC, unlike other agencies, has only a social and cultural mandate
in br6-adcasting. It does set rates and grant licences, but its mandating broad-
cast legislation makes no reference to the economics of the industry. 12 These
more traditional regulatory activities are used to implement the socio-cultural
goals of the legislation.
The CRTC is known for its innovative procedures in broadcasting regu-
lation,' 3 so it is not surprising that one major dilemma originated in a proce-
dural debate. The agency's innovative practice, while stopping short of fund-
ing for intervenors, provides for an informal hearing process that encourages
participation and debate on a broad range of social questions.
When the CRTC was given jurisdiction over telecommunications in 1975,
it inherited some very formal procedures and two restrictive mandates. Regu-
lation in telecommunications conforms to traditional regulatory theory. The
agency protects a public interest, statutorily defined as ensuring just and
reasonable rates and access to service without discrimination. 14 The govern-
ment has considered the regulated companies as natural monopolies, and,
therefore, has attempted to stimulate forces that resemble competitive pres-
sures. The focus is on economic regulation.
Even within the framework of telecommunications regulations, however,
the CRTC sought a more informal procedure. According to one Commissioner
at the time, the hope was to match broadcast and telecommunication regula-
tion to the greatest degree possible, given the different mandates.', Dispensing
entirely with procedural formality was impossible, but the CRTC's draft tele-
communication procedures, released for debate in 1976, went further than
anyone anticipated. The formality of the process and the rights of participants
before the agency were altered. It also instituted hearings that resemble rule-
making hearings in American agencies, that is, regional and issue hearings for
the general discussion of social and policy questions.
No doubt the agency expected opposition from the regulated telecom-
munications industry but support from the public advocate groups for the
decreased formality and scope of regulatory discussion. Surprisingly, the
majority of public intervenors pressed for more formal procedural safeguards.
How had an uneasy alliance between some of the public advocate groups and
the industry developed? Why was one public advocate group pressing for in-
creased public access and discussion while others, also in the name of public
participation, sought formality in procedure and restrictions on the range of
debate?
12 The goals of the Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11, include "national unity"
and the strengthening and enriching of the social, cultural, and economic fabric of Can-
ada (s. 2). The Act lays out the manner in which the CRTC is to function with respect
to these goals and nowhere emphasizes those functions that we now associate with eco-
nomic regulation.
13 The CRTC procedures are discussed in Johnston, The Canadian Radio-Television
and Telecommunications Commission, Canada Law Reform Commission, Administrative
Law Series (Ottawa: Min. of Supply & Services, 1980).
14 Railway Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-2, ss. 320, 321.
15 Interview notes with Harry J. Boyle, March 1976.
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The question cannot be answered without examining the theoretical
foundations of the advocates' positions. The point of agreement among these
groups was related to the role intervenors may play in stimulating competitive
pressures in the market. The point of disagreement, it appears, centred on
concepts of the regulatory process itself.
For some public advocates, regulation constituted a political marketplace
in its own right. The concept of the political marketplace was, as Trebilcock
later put it, a process of collective decision-making involving "an intricate set
of interactions among voters, politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups and the
media in which competing claims for favourable politics are brokered.""'
Public policy-making, he has suggested, "is not at all a technocratic consensus
based exercise but a value laden conflict ridden process of intergroup media-
tion."' 7 From this perspective, regulatory agencies are one of many forums
within which negotiation takes place. In the case of agencies, partly because of
their apparent insulation from the political process, the political and economic
marketplaces are interwoven.
From this view, it is logical to argue that the consumer/voter must be
represented, even if that representation might demand some form of cross-
subsidy. Advocates argue that consumers will not act in economic regulation to
simulate pressures of competition without measures being taken to overcome
barriers to their participation. Similarly, consumer representation, if necessary
in the political marketplace to ensure a full and fair discussion of values and
interests, might also have to be supported.
For other public advocates at the time, the view that all political life
should be seen as a marketplace of values and interests posed problems. Such
a perspective either reduced all social and cultural values to factors compar-
able to property interests or it failed to take into account any other form of
political involvement than that tied to direct interests. Public interest, at
worst, was synonymous with economic interests; at best, it was seen as the
result of interest negotiations among competing groups of individuals. For
these advocates, public interest was misconstrued as simply the aggregate in-
terests of those who engaged in the negotiations. Such a view of public in-
terest begged the question. How could it encompass culture, national or re-
gional identity, community or the goal of supporting a diversity of informa-
tiofi? For those public advocates who supported the new informal procedures,
a concept of "collective good" was required, however difficult it might be to
put into practice.' 8 They sought social, not economic, regulation. And while
they equated public interest with "collective good", and did not assume that
governments or their agencies would necessarily provide it, the goal of proce-
dural reform in their view was to facilitate the determination of the collective
10 Trebilcock and Englehart, "Subsidizing Public Participation in Collective Deci-
sion-Making" (Toronto: University of Toronto Administrative Law Readings, mimeo,
1980) at 341.
17 Id.
Is For further discussion of the distinction between collective and public goods, see
Salter, The Role of the Public in Scientific Determination of Policy: The Canadian In-
quiry Process (1981), 31 U. of T. LJ. 343.
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good. The debate before the agency was itself critical, for it was out of a full
and participatory debate that an adequate concept of what constituted a "col-
lective good", the public interest, might properly be determined.
In fact, the conflict in this case was not simply between groups of public
intervenors. The CRTC has a mandate, in broadcasting, that does measure
collective good, in terms of national unity, quality of life, culture, experience
and relationships. 19 One might argue that such questions had no place in tele-
communications but it is not surprising that an agency would attempt to
harmonize, to the greatest extent possible, its socio-cultural and economic
mandates. One might also argue, as indeed some have done in the American
context, that qualitative values and indirect interests have no place in a regu-
latory forum. Their inclusion in broadcast regulation could not be regarded as
illegitimate if legislation demanding it was passed with the unanimous consent
of Parliament. Whether such a framework for regulation was workable or not,
the right of Parliament to set it must go unchallenged.
Nor would the CRTC have felt that its inclusion of social questions in a
strictly economic telecommunications mandate went contrary to Canadian
political tradition. Other agencies, with a mandate similar to the CRTC's tele-
communication legislation, are explicitly directed to serve the "national in-
terest". 20 In one case where Cabinet overturned the decision of the CRTC in
telecommunications, it did so because the CRTC decision, although well with-
in its regulatory mandate, was "not in the national interest".2'1 As well, the
government department to which the CRTC reports has conducted numerous
studies, many of which conclude with a recommendation that social questions
be considered in the development of new telecommunications technologies. -22
The satellite corporation, Telesat, which is regulated as telecommunications,
was established with explicitly social goals. Therefore, the CRTC's inclusion
of social and policy discussions was not surprising.
But locating the genesis of the conflict does not explain the coalitions that
formed on procedural reform. Another illustration of the problem would be
helpful. The Telecommunication Workers Union recently sought help to ap-
pear before the CRTC on competition issues. Surprisingly, they considered
their natural allies in the fight to be the British Columbia Telephone Com-
pany (B.C. Tel.) with which they had had demonstrably bad labour relations,
and their opponent to be an agency smitten with the idea of competition. As
'9 Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11, s. 3(b).
20 Belobaba, Berkow, Denhez, and MacDonald, On the Question of Consumer
Advocacy (Ottawa: Canadian Consumer Council, 1972). The National Energy Board is
a good example; see, National Energy Board Act, S.C. 1959, c. 46.
21 Slaco, The Telesat-TCTS Merger (Vancouver: unpublished M.A. thesis, Simon
Fraser University, 1979).
22 E.g., McNulty, Other Voices in Broadcasting: The Evolution of New Forms of
Local Programming in Canada (Ottawa: Dep't. of Comm., 1979); Lum and Ho, Con-
cluding Report Rural Communications Program (Ottawa: Dep't. of Comm., 1981);
Can., Dep't. of Comm., Special Program of Cultural Initiatives (Ottawa: Min. of Supply
and Services, 1980); Hudson, The Northern Pilot Project: an Evaluation, prepared for
the D.O.C. (Ottawa: Dep't. of Comm., 1974).
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anyone who participates in the regulatory arena knows, polarities of left and
right break down in this context. What is it about regulation and the regula-
tory debate that causes this to happen?
H. FIRST ANSWERS
It was suggested above that much debate within the regulatory arena
employs symbolic logic. The terms "user pay" and "deregulation" are part of
a symbolic logic. They may have theoretical referents, but they are often used
within the regulatory debate without reference to the theories, or even to the
empirical data, in which they may be grounded. "State intervention" is a
problematic concept when severed from an analysis of the economy, since few
would argue that the state should withdraw completely from all aspects of
economic life. "Consumer representation", "public participation" and "econ-
omy" are all often used in symbolic logics.
When used as part of a symbolic logic each of these terms represents an
element of a fuller theoretical analysis, but one that is abstracted from that
analysis and discussed without reference to the theoretical or descriptive sphere
within which their use is logically justified. Because these terms are abstrac-
tions (symbols) and because major gaps exist in their logical derivation, it is
possible for actors to reintegrate them into an analytical framework or a de-
scription of reality matching their own. This reintegration takes place on an
individual level, that is, in the consciousness of actors independent of each
other. Within the fuller ideological or theoretical logics that actors bring to the
regulatory debate, these symbolic terms take on shades of meaning that are
different for each of the participants. When they do, they can be used as a
medium of exchange in the formation of coalitions and conflicts.
Not all symbols are conducive to adoption by various oppositional
groups. As symbols are integrated in a logic (a coherent structure of argument
and belief) that seeks to reconstruct reality in a particular image, some sym-
bols are more conducive to manifold use and interpretation. The concept
"user pay" is less likely to have multiple interpretative possibilities than that
of "deregulation". "State intervention" and "public interest", however, are
easily conducive to being used within different theoretical or ideological logics.
One might argue that this process of reintegrating symbols into pro-
foundly different descriptive or theoretical analyses is simply tactical or even
cynical, since the highly visible nature of regulatory debate demands a tactical
orientation on the part of any successful actor. Yet neither cynicism nor tactics
are necessary for this process to occur. It can be that those who are uncon-
scious of the tactical significance of finding agreement on the symbols do so
anyway. They may be acting in good faith. Not all coalitions are tactically
advantageous, and not all agreements are composed in a clear, mutual assess-
ment of the advantages. When traditional political alliances fail to materialize,
the tactical loss may be greater than the net gain from any new coalition. And
some of these conflicts and coalitions are genuinely surprising to everyone in-
volved.
It is important to keep in mind that there are large incentives for func-
tioning primarily, or even solely, at the level of the symbolic. For the actors
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themselves, symbolic logic is persuasive. For the agency, operating in the con-
text of a public hearing, symbolic logics are effective. For the media, the con-
stituent interest groups and the general public, the use of symbols and sym-
bolic logic makes possible a simplification of complex issues, and an easy iden-
tification of political positions in a confusing debate. It may be that the con-
tradictions remain because the actors in the regulatory arena feel no need or
pressure to remove them. Tracing the missing links from symbolic logic back
to theory may well be counterproductive for those actually involved in the
debate.
Is it worth trying to trace the missing links for our purpose, which is the
identification of the value debate in regulation? Could a reconstruction of the
theoretical debate in the regulatory arena aid in understanding the unusual
political coalitions and conflicts that develop there? Given the difficulty of
identifying values-in-conflict in the Canadian case, it makes sense to try. It
would demand, however, not only reconstruction of the possible theoretical
debate in regulation but also, as was noted in the introduction, some attention
to the methodology and approach being taken by the actors.
A cautionary note. Because actors argue without reference to theory, it
is easy to err in reconstructing their theoretical debate. Any attempt to ac-
count for coalitions by reference to an apparent similarity in radically differ-
ent theoretical orientations may turn out to be superficial or illusory. To
argue, for example, that there is some deep-rooted theoretical congruence
between left and right in order to account for coalitions in the regulatory de-
bate would stretch the point. Nonetheless, it may be possible to locate some
points of convergence in some very different theoretical orientations.
The starting point for any reconstruction of the theoretical debate must
be with the actors themselves. What is of interest is the theoretical approach
informing their use of symbolic logic. How then to categorize these theoreti-
cal orientations, given that it is we, not the actors, who do the labelling? The
categories used must be clear enough to penetrate the real differences, yet
general enough to permit a wide range of views within any orientation.
The theoretical orientations can be categorized as "classical", "rationa-
list" and "critical". They are comparable to Macpherson's "liberal", "liberal-
democratic" and "non-liberal democratic".2 Macpherson's typology is ap-
propriate as it was developed to aid in the identification of the underlying
value debate in the discussion of democracy, an objective that roughly paral-
lels that of this paper. As for Macpherson, the purpose here is to trace value
orientations through their theoretical lineage, over time and in a dynamic way.
Macpherson's terminology has been changed where terms like "liberal" and
"democratic" are themselves value-laden and subject to multiple interpretation.
Following Macpherson, then, "classical" retains none of its specificity
from current economic theory. It is a broad term encompassing monetarists,
adherents to marginalism or utilitarianism (even revised marginalism) and in
23 Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (London: Oxford University Press,
1966) at 4-11.
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practice most who would consider themselves conservative in orientation. As
the term is used here, classical actors in the regulatory arena operate loosely
within the spirit of classical liberalism.
Adherents to rationalism, in contrast, more closely align themselves with
what Macpherson calls liberal democratic theory. Rationalists add the demo-
cratic urge to liberalism. They pose a critique for liberal theorists; a critique
based on recognition of the institutional features of markets and social organi-
zation. They are called "rationalist" here because they view human nature
primarily in terms of its potential for rationality but, unlike the classical ac-
tors, they usually see rationality as extending beyond interest maximization.
The term "critical" includes Marxists and non-Marxists. Critical actors
reject the tenets and methodological predispositions of both liberalism and
liberal-democracy. Human nature is not just interest maximizing; nor is it
simply tied to man's inherent potential for rationality. Human nature is, above
all, social. It is fashioned in the production of the means of subsistence and in
the attendant social relations.
III. CONVERGENCE AND CONFLICT IN THE REGULATORY ARENA
Having identified some possible theoretical orientations, let us turn to the
debate itself. It is argued here that two concepts of regulation are used inter-
changeably, or fused into one, in the regulatory debate. Determining what is
meant by "regulation" is the first step in locating the positions of classical,
critical and rationalist actors. Some surprising points of possible convergence
between the actors emerge.
In some cases, when "regulation" is used, it means state involvement in
activities integral to the character and functioning of the economy. "Integral" is
the key word here. An assumption is often made that an economy has its own
character, an identifiable dynamic or deep structure. State actions, from this
perspective, constitute an intervention in that dynamic, potentially altering the
character of the economy. They facilitate, compensate for, or block the inner
mechanisms of the economy itself. The common expressions "tinkering with
the economy" and "let the market decide" are examples from this perspective.
Regulation, then, is simply one form of state action. State action is an
interference, for better or for worse, in the dynamic of the economy. The
state acts to shape the environment and in doing so influences the economy.
It supports firms faltering under pressures of competition or new technologies.
It provides risk capital and social programmes to compensate for the negative
fallout of economic actions. When the state action is regulatory, the state is
involved in those actions that indirectly affect the dynamic of the economy.
Actions that indirectly affect the economy include creating barriers to the
entry of new firms or mediating intra-industry conflict or competition. They
might involve determining the role for public capital in a private economy
or recognizing the "legitimacy" of monopoly in some sectors of the economy
and providing some compensatory measures. The assumption is made that
state action is extraordinary, made necessary by distortion in the economy or
pressures having little or no direct economic justification.
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Second, "regulation" can also be used as a synonym for rules, the actual
directives issued by the agency in fulfilling its mandate. Because the regulated
industries, as well as others, need to know the rules of the game and seek a
role in constructing them, regulation may be sought by industry to bring order
out of chaos. From this perspective, the debate about "regulation" concerns
how many and which rules, not the state's right to regulate.
If one views regulation as a synonym for rules, those rules may be tacti-
cal or have strategic significance. As tactics, specific regulations further speci-
fic ends. Those ends may be the resolution of conflicts or the protection of
the public from the health and safety effects of economic actions. The ends
may be to simplify the licensing process in order to further economic develop-
ment or to complicate it to ensure that the regulated industry is responsive to
social and political factors. The goal may be to eliminate competitors or to
encourage them. The rules provide a currency, enabling bargains to be made.
These bargains determine who will be allowed to do what, occasionally to
whom, and at what cost.
If the rules, or regulations, are simply tactical, then anyone may join the
fight to ensure that regulations put in place correspond to their interests. Even
those who decry all state intervention may seek rules matched to those regu-
latory goals they consider unavoidable in the context of an imperfect economic
system.
There are some, however, who also see regulation as strategic. Rejecting
the assumption of a deep structure to the economy, they focus only on the
negotiations between interests that shape all aspects of economic, social and
political life. The regulatory agency is a forum for the negotiation of interests;
regulations themselves represent the bargains struck among the interested
parties. As such, what emerges as regulation is of critical importance. Regula-
tion and policy merge because policies are often set only through regulation
and because regulation determines the practical effect of policies.
The unlikely coalition of right and left is centered in these different con-
cepts of the term "regulation". Both classical and critical actors begin from
the assumption that the economy has a deep structure, or inner dynamic. For
both, regulation is a form of state action constituting an intervention in that
dynamic and potentially altering the nature or character of the economy itself.
That intervention may be viewed positively or negatively by either classical or
critical actors. It may be viewed as inevitable or unavoidable given the distor-
tions of, or produced by, the economy itself. In the "deregulation" debate,
however, both critical and classical actors are talking about the same thing.
The breakdown of the traditional alliance between liberals and the left,
between critical and rationalist actors, is also centred here. As noted above,
not all actors are prepared to view regulation simply as a forum for the nego-
tiation of interests, however widely defined. The rationalists' emphasis on the
strategic importance of the negotiations of regulation as rule-making clashes
with the view that the economy has its own dynamic. The rationalists' em-
phasis on interest-in-negotiation runs counter to the critical actor's view of
human nature as intrinsically social. We come back to the original problem of
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this paper; the rationalists saw the relatively informal telecommunication
hearing procedures as imposing some limitation on the rights of interested
parties to a full and fair negotiation. They sought more formal procedures
because they believed only those procedures could guarantee access of all
parties to the negotiation. The critical actors, on the other hand, refused to
believe that the only purpose of regulation was a negotiation of interests; for
them, an informal debate was more likely to produce a working definition of
the public interest.
IV. THE VALUE DEBATE IN REGULATION
If regulation is viewed as rule-making and seen as tactical, the value de-
bate is easy to identify. Regulations regarding value-laden issues, such as reli-
gious broadcasting, allow certain people to engage in activities for the benefit
of some segments of the community. The decisions about which regulations
will be adopted, what activity will be allowed, reflect value choices; their pro-
ponents muster as much tactical sense as they can. Sometimes, tactics demand
coalitions with those whose political or value orientation is different; these
alliances are to be expected.
What is surprising are the coalitions that have no obvious tactical signi-
ficance, such as coalitions on an issue like "deregulation". These coali-
tions appear to reflect an agreement on values among those whose political
and value orientations differ sharply. It is suggested that the agreement is not
about values per se. The intuitive understanding of what is going on in the
regulatory arena is not at odds with reality. Those who argue for deregulation
from "free enterprise" theory have not suddenly found sympathy for Marxists
who may also see deregulation positively.
Rather, these coalitions are based in a shared view of how values are,
and can be, derived.24 What is actually congruent in the theoretical orientation
24 Material for this section was prepared on the basis of the following reference
works: Breton, The Regulation of Private Economic Activity (Montreal: C.D. Howe
Research Inst., 1976); Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' 'A
Theory of Justice' (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1975); Dewey, "Regulatory Reform,"
in Shepherd and Gies, eds., Regulation in Further Perspective: The Little Engine
That Might (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1974), ch. 2; Cohen and Stigler, Can
Regulatory Agencies Protect Consumers? (Washington: American Enterprice In-
stitute, 1971); Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: U. of Chic. Press,
1962); Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, (rev.
ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956); Gouldner, The Two Marxisms, supra
note I; Green, ed., The Monopoly Makers: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Reg-
ulation and Competition (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973); Kolko, Railroads and
Regulation 1877-1916 (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1965); Mattick, Marx and Keynes
(London: Merlin Press, 1969); Meek, Smith, Marx & After (London: Chapman & Hall,
1977); Panitch, ed., The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power (To-
ronto: U. of T. Press, 1977); Pilling, Marx's 'Capital': Philosophy and Political Economy
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); Posner, supra note 4; Posner, Theories of
Economic Regulation (1974), 5 Bell J. of Econ. and Mgmt. Sci. 335; Rawls, supra
note 4; Stanbury, Government Regulation: Scope, Growth and Process (Montreal: Inst.
for Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1980); Stigler, The Theory of Regulation (1971), 2 Bell
J. of Econ. and Mgmt. Sci. 3; Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation
(Chicago: U. of Chic. Press, 1975).
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of these different actors is a view of the derivation of values, used in resource
allocation. Returning to the different definitions of "regulation" current in the
regulatory debate, those who see regulation as rule-making in a strategic sense,
and as a form of negotiation of interests, will take a different view of how
public good can and should be determined than those who view the economy
as having an inner dynamic, and state action as an intervention in that dynamic.
It was earlier stated that all value systems have three points of reference
in common. These points of reference-a concept of a standard, a concept of
resource allocation, and a view of the relationship between the individual and
society-act as a schema in demonstrating how different definitions of "regu-






concept of endemic to endemic to reflect
a standard economic class assumptions
relations relations or derived
from a study
of behaviour
concept of by-product by-product product of
resource of market of class negotiations
allocation forces relation in each case
and struggle
view of the social is social and individuals
individual/ coercive of individual in relation-
social individuals mutually ship consti-
relation- determinant tute system
ship (and coer-
cive)
In filling in the boxes, points of possible convergence in
theoretical orientations become clear.
radically different
If, for example, both critical and classical actors begin with the assump-
tion of a deep structure to the economy, a deep structure shaped by but also
fundamentally determinant of social goods, then stardards are seen by both as
endemic. Public good is derived as a by-product of economic relations, given
the possibilities inherent in human nature. Human nature, in turn, necessarily
has a specific content; it generates the deep structure that produces social
goods. Morality, ethics, human consciousness of values may all be conceived
as reflecting individual choice (or praxis) ,25 but morality, for both critical and
classical actors, is grounded in human nature as it is manifest in economic (or
class) relations. Public good is a given in a system of choices (or praxis) and
25 Terminology used in this section is from a classical perspective; parallel terms
more appropriate to a critical perspective are in parentheses.
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economic (or class) relations, even if individual actors in that system are rela-
tively free to act as individuals in making moral choices (constituting their
political praxis).
From the perspective that the economy has an inner dynamic, resource
allocation can be seen also as a creation of the deep structuring of the regu-
lative dynamics of the economy. Rewards, and indeed their just or unjust
distribution, are a by-product of the regulative mechanisms (market or class
relations). From the perspective of both critical and classical actors, negotia-
tion of interests (or class conflict) is the instrument, and not the source, of
resource allocation. As both classical and critical actors also view the regula-
tory process tactically, resource allocation may simply be a product of the
rules negotiated or of measures taken (and bargained for tactically) to com-
pensate for regulative or rule-making actions.
Finally, for both classical and critical actors, individual action (human
praxis) is important, but individual actions, taken separately, do not determine
the deep structure of the economy. Only in aggregate (or through class rela-
tionships and struggle) do individual actions compose society. The social, then,
is theoretically separable from the individuals who make it up. The social, or
aggregate, choice (or composite praxis and relations) coerces the individual. It
structures a reality within which individual choice (or praxis) takes place.
This framework may not be recognized by the actors within it. Individuals
make choices as if their actions were not shaped by or determinant of the
market (or people are in class relationships but not necessarily members of
a class). Yet in the view of critical and classical actors, the resulting structure
of the market (or class relationships) limits the choices available.
The rationalist view is quite different. For the rationalist, -6 human na-
ture lacks specificity of content. Instead, it is comprised of the potential for
creative, rational and ethical action or thought. Thus, locating the basis of a
standard poses difficulties. It is barely given in the nature of individuals and
it cannot be found in some deep structuring of the economy based on human
nature.
Where do standards come from for the rationalist? They may simply be
the product of assumptions. Actions that result in harm to people or property
are wrong. They may be derived from the rationalists' view of human nature;
anything that constrains the human potential for rationality is wrongful. They
may also be derived from the study of human behaviour itself. Because indi-
viduals cannot be viewed separately from the society in which they live, those
who are in a position to understand social or psychological constraints should
play a role in determining standards. Psychologists, from the rationalists' per-
spective, can play a role by contributing an analysis of motivation; socio-biol-
ogists by examining the limitations of human nature; economists by reviewing
marketplace behaviour; and sociologists by studying organizational behaviour.
These professionals indicate what is socially, thus individually, possible for
20 See Daniels, supra note 24 and Rawls, supra note 4.
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humans to achieve, thereby establishing the parameters of human potential in
society.
Resource allocation, for the rationalist, is a product of negotiations in
the first instance. Fair and just distribution of social goods can be indicated
only with reference to the assumed or externally derived standard and the
process of negotiation through which it is derived. The process itself must be
fair and fully participatory. It determines whether the social good will be
realized, and indeed, whether the human potential for creative, rational and
ethical action can be fulfilled.
In rejecting the idea of a deep structure, the rationalist sees the social as
compositive, as an integration of the actions, values, interests and ideas of
individuals. This integration takes place through institutions, which formalize
the relations of interdependence. Embedded in the concept of social as corn-
positive is an assumption of a consensual basis of society and its institutions.
This consensus does not preclude conflict relations, either within institutions
or between them. Rither, it is formed by the mutuality of values and interests
crystallized in any institution, by members' participation in a process of con-
flict and, often, by their agreement to participate in a process of conflict reso-
lution. At the core of the rationalist view is the concept of interdependence.
For the rationalist, then, social institutions are not something coercive
of individuals, although they do constrain behaviour and options for individual
action. Social institutions, that is, society, are created in the continuing direct
participation of the individuals who comprise them and reflect both mutuality
and conflict in interests, predispositions and values. Social institutions coerce
their participants only in the sense that any relations necessarily shape and
constrain the actions and consciousness of those involved in them.
Society, when conceived in terms of the interdependence of individuals
and institutions that make it up, is a system. The economy is a subsystem
(and indeed in some senses also a social institution) within it. Two points fol-
low. Firstly, a sociology of institutions is a necessary, although by no means
sufficient, part of understanding the dynamics involved in the economy.
27
Secondly, utilitarianism, which takes as its unit of analysis individuals rather
than relationships in a system, will no longer suffice to explain economic be-
haviour although it may still account for some individual actions.
The regulatory arena is seen by the rationalist not simply as an arena
of action, but also as a social institution in its own right. As such it is con-
nected to and interdependent with the economy, the political process and
other institutions within society. The relations played out through regulation
(that is, in the regulatory arena and through rules) not only shape the regu-
lation as a social institution, they feed back into the system relationships of the
2 7 See, e.g.. Blau, Inequality and Homogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social
Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1977) and Exchange and Power in Social Life
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964) for the type of social theory most easily applied
to an anaylsis of institutions by classicists and those rationalists who view human nature
as primarily interest-maximizing.
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economy, policy process and indeed society itself. Thus for the rationalist,
negotiations about and within the regulatory arena are of paramount impor-
tance; they constitute the praxis of determining public good.
The different views of "regulation" have been used as a means of explain-
ing why coalitions are possible between critical and classical actors. They also
indicate why rationalists, who traditionally form alliances with critical actors
in political debate, fail to do so in regulation. The picture is, of course, more
complex. Sometimes rationalist and classical actors work closely together;
sometimes the traditional coalition between liberals and the left emerge also
in regulation. Given the argument thus far, how does this happen?
If the rationalist argues that what constitutes public good (national
unity, Canadian culture, regional identity) is self-evident, that is, requires no
explicit derivation beyond that fashioned in the political process or in the
minds of individuals, he is brought potentially close to the critical actor, since
the vision of what is good may be shared even though its derivation is not.
Even if the rationalist argues that social institutions generate morality in the
mutuality of interests of their members, they may find common ground with
the critical actors. The substance of that morality, what constitutes a basis for
consensus, may be identical for the critical actor and the rationalist even if
their views of institutions are not.
What distinguishes the rationalist from the classical actor, on the other
hand, is, in part, a recognition of the institutional features of markets and
social organizations. Those institutional features can, however, be described
simply in terms of the aggregate actions of their participants. When they are,
and to the extent that the human potential for rationality includes interest-
maximization as a central component, the rationalist and classical actor find
points of theoretical convergence. The systems approach does not necessarily
preclude a view of society as a marketplace if the marketplace is itself viewed
as a social system. Thus, alliances between classical and rationalist actors are
also possible.
Before proceeding in the final section of this paper to show how these
convergences and conflicts are played out in communication regulation, it is
necessary to consider one more point. What separates classical, rationalist and
critical approaches (as attributed to actors in regulation) is not just differences
in theoretical orientation but also deep-rooted methodological disputes. To
put it simply, points of conflict are possible, even when theoretical conver-
gence occurs, because of disputes about how research translates into theory.
It is not startling to suggest that classical actors hold to an empiricist
methodology, at least implicitly. The study of society, and the economy, is the
study of its elements which are variables in creating effects. The "invisible
hand" is, in practice, only the demonstrable effect of equally demonstrable
choices and actions taken by individuals. Economic factors, such as supply
and demand, may, as Marxists and others point out, be reified, but they too
are the demonstrable effects of demonstrable actions. The relation posed be-
tween the social and the individual, and indeed between theory and research,
is mechanical in the sense of a machine and its working parts. Nothing is
mediated or transformed in the transition from one level to another.
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For the rationalists, holding to a functionalist, or systems, approach, the
object of study is the relationships between actors and institutions. Relation-
ships are not, themselves, demonstrable as they can only be studied in terms
of the inputs and outputs they presuppose or generate. Relationships mediate
the demonstrable actions of individuals and the social institutions of which
they are a part; they give action its significance. Thus, the process of media-
tion is central to the study, even if it cannot be studied directly but must be
imputed from demonstrable actions and effects.
Critical actors usually reject functionalism although drawing from it in-
sights about the nature of relationships. What they reject is functionalism's
inherent bias towards system equilibrium and its reliance on consent as the
basis of social institutions. Equilibrium may exist, and consent may be given,
but an analysis that focuses on equilibrium or consent ignores the inherently
unstable nature of both. It disguises the endogenous dynamics creating change
within social institutions and systems. A systems analysis can illustrate rela-
tionships; it is seldom causal in orientation.
If the theoretical effort is to locate causal dynamics, as critical actors
suggest it should be, and if the theories produced are to be explanatory, then
linkage between the study of demonstrable actions and effects and the relation-
ships giving them significance cannot simply be imputed. What is demanded,
critical actors might suggest, is a transformative analysis: 28 the use of the de-
monstrable as a basis for developing an explanatory analysis, one revealing
the hidden dynamics and making comprehensible the forces which, although
invisible to actors, nonetheless shape their actions. The explanation must, of
course, relate back to the demonstrable, the actual and potential development
of social institutions and historical relationships. For the critical methodolo-
gist, the link between theory and research must be present, but the linkage is
neither direct nor simply imputed.
This methodological debate is important in understanding the value de-
bate in regulation, since it affects the way that information is brought into
and used within the regulatory arena by different actors. It can be said that
classical actors present the world as they have studied it. It is inevitably a
familiar, even persuasive, view to all actors in the regulatory tribunal, since
all can clearly see themselves acting in it.
Rationalists often argue for an understanding of the relationships and
institutional realities that frame action, pointing out the effects caused by
these imputed relationships. They call for "structural solutions" to problems
in regulation.
2 8 The idea of transformative analysis comes originally from Hegel but is most often
applied to Marx's methodology by those who consider Marx's approach to be Hegelian.
At the core of a transformative approach is the contention that outward appearance and
"the essence of things" seldom coincide; thus an explanation or analysis productively
draws from descriptive work (and relates back to it) but seeks to go beyond description
to reveal the internal structuring or dynamics of what is being described. For an excel-
lent exposition of the concept of transformative methodology, see Pilling, supra note 24,
at 21-22, 82-83.
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Critical actors, on the other hand, hope to influence the debate through
the persuasive power of their explanatory framework; evidence submitted
provides illustrations of how well the framework explains what is happening.
Often the prescriptions advocated by the critical actor are directed to the
creation of a policy framework within which regulations might best be de-
veloped. "Best" in this case means both most effectively and most ethically,
given the value stance of the critical actor.
V. COMMUNICATION REGULATION: A CASE STUDY
As noted above, regulatory debate is seldom theoretical but more often
ideological and symbolic. Before examining the ideological and symbolic
logics, it would be helpful to illustrate just how the issues, coalitions and
conflicts get played out in the case of communication regulation. A list of
some current issues should suffice:
1. In telecommunications, debate rages on the scope and justification for
natural monopoly, sparked by companies offering new services that inter-
connect with the established common carriers. The debate itself takes a
form similar to its American counterpart. What is interesting in the Cana-
dian case is the obvious reluctance of the federal government to match
the CRTC's concern for competition, given that the new companies in-
volved fit well within an "industrial strategy" centred on encouraging
new growth industries in high technology fields.
2. As this debate is played out in British Columbia, the Telecommunica-
tions Workers Union supports the carriers' claim to legitimate monopoly,
arguing that only a large company with a monopoly can sustain Canadian
economic development. The union and the carrier have been known in
the past for their poor labour-management relations.
3. Yet, some of the people working with the union have intervened before
the CRTC on the question of acquisitions proposed by one of the larger
cable companies, suggesting that the consolidated unit is not in the public
interest and potentially monopolistic. They suggest that the merger will be
counterproductive of effective regulation.
4. The cable company's argument in this case, and indeed in others, is based
on the need for large corporate units to compete with the monopolistic
common carriers to promote innovation in telecommunication technologies.
5. Meanwhile, in broadcasting, officials from the federal Department of Com-
munications have argued for a free access, free flow of information policy
in Canada, given the new communication resources generated by innova-
tion in the industry. Yet the government as a whole seems committed in-
stead to a revision of the Broadcasting Act2 that leaves intact the social
and cultural provisions of the current legislation, provisions that could not
be met under a free flow policy.
20 R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11.
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6. Advocates stress the need for the social mandate, but may also argue for
free flow of information. They seek to protect Canadian culture through
the broadcasting system yet, as detailed above, also urge procedural guar-
antees less appropriate to discussion of social questions or cultural pro-
tection.
7. FM broadcasters are currently engaged in a deregulation campaign, but
broadcasters have been the strongest supporters of the regulatory protec-
tion the agency provides for their markets.30 FM broadcasters in particu-
lar have benefitted from the segmented market created through regulation.
8. In the current constitutional debate in Canada, communication regulation
looms large. It is clear to all that provincial regulation of communications
would lead to a more traditional economic regulatory supervision of the
industry. Yet the same people who argue for provincial or regional control
of regulation do so in the name of increasing the capacity of the broad-
casting system to respond to regional cultures, that is, social concernsa'
The list goes on. Those who attack a general application of a "user pay"
approach as destroying the system of universal service built up in this century
actually support "user pay" with reference to other telecommunications ser-
vices, or more significantly, as a means of facilitating the goals of the Broad-
casting Act in a new service such as pay television. In the name of "diversity
of information" Canada may either get or reject religious broadcasting stations
(the matter is currently under consideration3 2). In the name of "participation",
northerners may gain access to southern originated television or block the
incursion of that same programming in the same communities. The contradic-
tions are manifold, but the actors assume their positions are based in a cohe-
rent approach and their actions are taken in good faith.
VI. THE VALUE DEBATE IN COMMUNCIATION REGULATION
Using the example of communication regulation, how do the coalitions
and conflicts get played out in practice? Here, the issue being discussed deter-
mines what position various actors will take in relation to each other. A list of
the current "issues" will suffice to illustrate the process.
A. Deregulation
To talk of "deregulation" for both classical and critical actors in com-
munication regulation is to speak simultaneously at two levels. At the level
of deep structure, the regulative impact of regulations and economic action,
deregulation means giving the inherently regulative dynamics of the economy
30 See public hearings on proposed regulation and promise of performance of FM,
CRTC, October 1973.
31 See, e.g., the public statements of Patrick McGeer, Minister of Communications,
Province of Britsih Columbia, made on 28 January 1982, 23 March 1982, and 21 May
1982; see "BC to launch cable TV fight", Vancouver Sun, Jan. 28, 1982 at 1.
32 See "Hearings tune in on 'pray TV' ", Winnipeg Free Press, Jan. 25, 1982 at
36; and "Free market stance urged for religious broadcasting", Winnipeg Free Press,
Jan. 27, 1982 at 25.
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full play. For very different reasons, the idea can be attractive to both critical
and classical actors. But no one in Canada is calling for total deregulation in
communications; even for classical actors, the consequences are seen to be too
great.
At the level of tactics, deregulation may free the cable industry from red
tape; explode the mythologies that lie behind the public interest debate; expose
communication monopolies and their protective support structure; and, finally,
open up the economy to innovation in new communication services. Again, for
different reasons, the idea is attractive to both classical and critical actors.
Deregulation could pose no such attractions for the rationalist, however
much the resulting increase in competitive opportunity might match his values.
What deregulation would do, necessarily, is constrict opportunities for the
negotiation of public goods or reduce the scope and power of agencies to en-
force whatever bargains had been reached. Deregulation, from the perspective
of the rationalists, also means eliminating a most visible and publicly acces-
sible forum for negotiation. It would entail leaving the negotiation to continue
behind closed doors of the Department of Communications (federal or provin-
cial) or Cabinet, and without procedural guarantees or rights of access for all
participants who have interests.
B. Public Interest
For the rationalist, "public interest" is tied to these guarantees of fair
process and access and to the high visibility of the negotiation within regula-
tory arenas. Public interest, here, is almost synonymous with procedural re-
form, establishing the right of parties to participate regardless of their direct,
that is, pecuniary, interest in what is a negotiation of political, economic and
social goods. Public interest is linked to freedom of information, which is
necessary in part to permit fair negotiations, but also to ensure the visibility of
the relationships between actors in the negotiations. As these relationships are
often disguised by their participants, freedom of information makes it possible
for more people to locate (and perhaps participate in) the debate and the
negotiation.
For the classical actor, "public interest" is simply aggregate interest,
again a product of the regulatory dynamic of the system. Measures that alter
the way in which the dynamic of the economy operates (or should operate)
may be taken in the name of the public interest. They are, at best, insignificant,
or at least compensatory for distortions in the regulative mechanisms of the
economy itself. For the classical actor, a problem remains; how can one justify
these interventions, even when the goal of intervention is compensatory? Why
should there be compensation? The classical actor cannot easily accept any
external derivation of the social good. Thus, caught in the contradictions pro-
duced by advocating compensatory measures, classical actors usually support
the continued protection of what they call natural monopolies in communica-
tion industries.
For the critical actor, "public interest", like all explanatory concepts, is
a transformative term. "Public interest" is what emerges from the debate
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about "the public interest" itself, and from the explanatory power of the anal-
ysis developed through that debate. The broader the scope of CRTC debate
and the more explicit the agency's social mandate, the more likely a fully ex-
planatory and justifiable "public interest" will emerge. The critical actor might
find an easy alliance with the rationalist; after all, increasing access to informa-
tion exposes mythologies about the regulative dynamics of the economy and
thus makes a critical explanation more persuasive to the agency or the public.
The alliance between critical and rationalist actors breaks down when the
price on freedom of information is greater than on procedural formality and
legalism. These are more appropriate to economic regulation than social debate.
C. Participation
"Participation" follows from the working definitions of "public interest".
From the classical actors' point of view, restricting participation to those with
direct interests makes sense as the best regulatory actions facilitate the regula-
tive dynamics of the economy. Those with direct, that is, property, interests
are more likely to facilitate, not obfuscate, the derivation of "public interest".
Others, like the various small advocate groups who create a noisy presence
in communication regulation, are seen to have no legitimate role.
If, however, the emphasis is on the negotiation of interests, as it is in
the rationalist's view, then effective participation is key. To be effective, parti-
cipants must be informed or expert. But since more than economic goods
are being negotiated, any group or individual is legitimately a participant, al-
beit not necessarily effective in the debate.
To those operating from a critical perspective, "participation" means
open access to any and all members of the public in the hope of generating a
wide ranging social debate to fashion the "public interest".
D. User Pay
"User pay" similarly reflects the working concepts of "public interest".
For classical actors, its attraction is obvious since its application allows de-
mand to be matched to price and use of service. For critical actors, "user
pay" can have two meanings. If, as is often argued, corporate users currently
pay less than the full cost of the telecommunication services they use, then
"user pay" would mean holding these major users to account for the full costs
of the production of their profits. On the other hand, "user pay" systems
potentially spell the end of a system of determining the price of a service on
a universal basis. It probably also means placing undue burdens on those
least able to afford them, northerners for example. The critical actor, then,
is caught in a dilemma and is potentially both an ally and an opponent of the
classical actor.
For the rationalist, the concept "user pay" requires redefinition. At best,
"user pay" will permit a full accounting for and fair assignment of the costs
of production. At worst, the shift to user pay represents simply a renegotia-
tion of interests, potentially but not necessarily involving a backsliding of
social value. Alliances with critical or classical actors are tactical.
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E. Natural Monopoly
For classical and critical actors, natural monopolies in communication
industries are indeed natural, albeit for different reasons. But from the per-
spective of the rationalist, they are simply the creation of social institutions,
particularly regulation itself. The claim to "natural" being discounted, the
rationalists debate whether the value of competition outweighs the benefits of
large corporate units in the Canadian context. For rationalists who share with
classical actors a strong belief in the beneficial effects of competition (the
CRTC, the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), monopoly is almost
always counterproductive of social good in the economic system within which
it develops. For those with a concept of public good derived outside the mar-
ketplace, for example, those believing in economic nationalism or measures
promoting a strong Canadian entrepreneurial class capable of competing in
world markets, monopoly may be a necessary evil, an instrument of beneficial
policies although not valued in its own right.
F. Concentration of Ownership
Concentration of ownership is not the same thing as monopoly; this is
crucial for the rationalist. The rationalist may argue that monopoly, like
tariffs, is necessary to achieve public goods like economic development. Con-
centration of ownership, on the other hand, inevitably makes regulatory super-
vision and enforcement more difficult. For the rationalist, it can seldom be
justified. For example, the CRTC decision on a possible merger between Tele-
sat (the Canadian satellite company that holds a monopoly on orbital satellite
facilities in Canada) and the TransCanada Telephone System (a consortium
of all telephone companies in Canada) reflected the agency's (and rationalist
intervenors') concern for the deleterious effects of concentration of owner-
ship.A3 The CRTC rejected the application for merger. But neither the CRTC
nor any rationalist intervenors argued (at the time) for an end to Telesat's
monopoly status. The rationalist bias inherent in the decision of the CRTC
(and the views of such intervenors as the Director of the Bureau of Compe-
tition) was not shared by the Department of Communications which argued
that limiting competition and even regulatory supervision was necessary "in
the national interest".
Since classical actors see a substantive difference between issues raised
by monopoly and by concentration of ownership, although neither is viewed
as necessarily counterproductive to the public interest, the alliance between
some rationalists and the classical actors is possible and has indeed occurred.
G. Free Flow of Information
Classical actors, in this case including the Department of Communica-
tions, whose interest in classical approaches is evident, argue directly for "the
free flow of information". Information, here, is viewed as a commodity; the
33 Telesat Canada, Proposed Agreement with Trans-Canada Telephone System,
Telecommunications Decision CRTC 77-10 (August 24, 1977).
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regulative dynamics of the marketplace provide the greatest, or at least the
most defensible, social good.
Critical actors recoil at the view of information simply as commodity
(although its commoditization may be recognized34), and hasten to point out
the social and cultural implications of the free flow policies. The rationalists
are caught in a dilemma. If, as many rationalists argue, information is crucial
in realizing the creative, rational and ethical potential in humans, and if in-
formation is central in a fair negotiation of interests, then any measure that
blocks access to information is either ill advised or wrong. If, on the other
hand, treating information as a commodity violates an assumed public good
(for example, cultural or national sovereignty), then free flow must be op-
posed. And if Parliament, as the prime legitimate forum for the negotiation
of public goods, has declared social and cultural values to be paramount in
broadcasting, then restricting free flow of information may be necessary to
achieve these goals. There are no clear answers for the rationalist.
Since neither classical nor critical actors share the dilemma, they provide
few possible resolutions and little guidance in the debate. The decision about
religious broadcasting stations, and even to some extent northern communica-
tions policy, is stalled here. The likelihood of a clear resolution, or at least one
acceptable to rationalists, is small. It is more likely that contradictory deci-
sions and policies will be adopted.
H. Due Process
Finally to the question of procedures that started the path of argument
in this paper. For classical actors, the agency is a court-like instrument for the
resolution of disputes between parties with direct interests. Like a court, it
requires a formal procedure (thus the alliance with the rationalists on proce-
dures), including due process. The rationalists would enlarge the scope of
negotiation and the range of parties involved, but, given the nature of regula-
tion as a process of "intergroup mediation", conflict ridden and value laden
mediation at that, due process is seen primarily as a guarantee that the rules
of the game will be enforced. Due process, for rationalists, extends rights to
all with an interest in what is being negotiated. The political actor is the con-
sumer of public goods negotiated. Methods appropriate for ensuring con-
sumer representation in economic regulation may well be applicable in other
kinds of negotiations as well.
If, however, within the rationalist view, the members of the public are
viewed as consumers of public (not just economic) goods, then the con-
sumer's, that is, the public's, claim to legitimacy is based in the representative-
ness of their participation. Representativeness is usually determined by refer-
ence to the number of people whose interests are being aggregated, or at least
to claims by consumers that they reflect public opinion. Thus, cultural groups
representing small numbers and no sizeable amount of public sentiment may
have little import in the negotiation even when the mandate of the agency is
3 Warskett, "The Information Economy in Late Capitalism," in Salter, supra note
2, at 178.
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cultural. Certainly, measures supporting their participation are not advocated
by rationalists with as much force as measures supporting consumer represen-
tation. Advocates for consumer representation, for example, seldom address
the problem of funding in broadcast hearings. 5
For the critical actor, public good equates with collective, not aggregate,
good. Anyone, no matter how few he represents, may legitimately argue a
point of view on what constitutes collective good. The power of the explana-
tory framework in matching both socially held (in the case of broadcast regu-
lation, explicitly social) goals and empirical realities determines the worth of
the opinions offered. Very occasionally, what is seen as a collective good by
the critical actor may converge with the view of an aggregate good presented
by the classical or rationalist actor. Here is where surprises occur.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, then, the convergences and conflicts, coalitions and arguments in
the regulatory arena make sense, even beginning from the assumption of good
will and coherence in the logic of the actors. These convergences and conflicts
can be sustained because they take place within a regulatory debate, in which
symbolic and ideological modes of "logic" predominate. The radical differ-
ences in theoretical orientation can remain submerged as long as large disin-
centives exist for making the linkages between symbols, ideology and theory
explicit. The fact that regulatory debate is oral, public, and highly conducive
to strategic or even manipulative use, supports the use of symbolic and ideol-
ogical logics, even if the account of reality is impoverished as a result.
If, however, ideological and symbolic logics operate as closed systems,
potential for new resolutions of problems in regulation is constricted by the
nature of the regulatory debate. Innovative responses to problems in regula-
tion and the integration of new information are foreclosed by the closed sys-
tem character of the debate. The confusion resulting from the surprising
coalition and conflicts in the regulatory debate has some advantages then. It
opens up the debate to compromise and innovation otherwise precluded by
the use of symbolic and ideological "logics" in the regulatory debate.
35 See, e.g., the excellent analysis by Kane (Consumers and the Regulators: Inter-
vention in the Federal Regulatory Process (Montreal: Inst. for Research on Pub. Pol'y,
1980)), which nonetheless fails to address seriously the problem of the lack of funding
for intervenors in broadcast hearings.
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